Europe has woken up literally caught between two fires. To the east, a Russia that celebrates the rise in energy prices and consolidates territorial gains in Donbas. To the west, a Trump Administration that demands total alignment while prioritizing its own commercial and geopolitical interests.
In the center, a continent that sees how the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz – provoked by the Iranian response to Operation ‘Epic Fury’ launched on February 28 – threatens to deindustrialize your economy y further fracture your unity.
The European Council summit on March 19 in Brussels was a faithful mirror of this reality. The 27 leaders expressed “great concern” about price spikes: gas rose up to 30% in a single day after attacks on infrastructure in Qatar, and a barrel of Brent has exceeded $100, stabilizing between 90 and 110 according to the most recent forecasts.
They demanded the urgent reopening of the Strait of Hormuz—through which 20% of the world’s oil and nearly 25% of the world’s LNG passes—an immediate moratorium on attacks on energy and water facilities, and “de-escalation and maximum containment.”
Some Member States (Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands) were willing to contribute to freedom of navigationbut only “when conditions permit.” They largely rejected Donald Trump’s direct request to send European military assets to the Strait. There is no appetite for a new naval mission in such a volatile scenario.
The European Commission will study temporary emergency measures: flexibility of state aid, possible reduction of the gas storage filling target to 80%, tax reductions and, if the crisis worsens, adaptations to the carbon market (ETS). But everyone knows that these are mere patches. The true vulnerability is structural.
At the aforementioned summit, European leaders harshly criticized Washington’s unilateral decision to temporarily ease sanctions on Russian oil to alleviate global prices. They considered it a strategic error that benefits Moscow and weakens its position against Ukraine.
Russia, the great beneficiary in the short term
While Europe suffers, Moscow smiles. Russian energy revenues have skyrocketed: from around $70 per barrel before the conflict to peaks greater than 100stabilizing around 90-100. In the first two weeks of March alone, Russia entered about 7.7 billion euros by fossil fuel exports, 14% more than the February average. Every extra euro is one more ruble for their war effort in Ukraine.
Russian advances in Donbas remain slow but steady. And in parallel, Moscow has intensified internal control: since the beginning of March, mobile internet blackouts in Moscow and St. Petersburg have become almost daily. The official excuse is the threat of Ukrainian drones that would use the networks to navigate.
The reality, according to analysts and diplomats, is twofold: making attacks more difficult and, above all, strengthening the “sovereign internet” to limit the dissemination of critical information at a time of purges in the Ministry of Defense and possible internal discontent. The system of “white list“: Only approved government services operate.
Europe, which had reduced its dependence on Russian pipeline gas from 40% in 2021 to 13% in 2025 thanks to REPowerEU, now finds itself in an uncomfortable paradox. Qatari gas – which many countries had substituted – has fallen drastically after the Iranian attacks. Qatar temporarily lost around 17% of its export capacity, with repairs that could take 3-5 years.
Suddenly, it would not hurt Europe to be able to draw on Russian resources again, even if indirectly through India or Türkiye. Putin, anticipating it, threatens to redirect his remaining LNG to Asia, paid in yuan and rubles.
United States: unilateral pragmatism
On the other side of the Atlantic, Trump’s second presidency has accelerated the transatlantic fracture. His National Security Strategy of the end of 2025 describes Europe as “strategically vital but downhill“, criticizes the EU for being “undemocratic” and proposes “cultivating resistance” within European countries against the current direction from Brussels.
In exchange, it prioritizes bilateral relations with nations such as Hungary, Poland, Italy or Austriaand demands that Europe assume much more responsibility in its defense.
The operation against Iran was not limited to neutralizing its nuclear program. Washington seeks a strategic reconfiguration of the global energy order. By paralyzing the Persian Gulf through Operation ‘Epic Fury’, the United States pursues several simultaneous objectives:
– Weaken Iranian exports to China and India, the main buyers of Iranian crude oil.
– Position itself as guarantor of maritime routes and main alternative supplier of crude oil and LNG.
– Force Europe and Asia to buy American liquefied natural gas at significantly higher prices.
– Promote arms sales to the Arab countries of the Gulf, which now need advanced defense systems (such as Patriot or THAAD) in the face of the Iranian threat.
The Trump Administration speaks openly of “regime change” in Tehran, although in recent days it has shown signs of flexibility and has postponed certain attacks, such as against power plants, to open a window for negotiations.
This could be a very improvised policy: it is imperial survival. The United States carries a public debt and needs to maintain dollar hegemony in global energy trade. If countries like Russia, China or the BRICS manage to consolidate oil transactions in yuan or other currencies, the dollar would lose some of its power. Controlling (or at least decisively influencing) the Persian Gulf ensures that oil and gas continue to orbit Washington.
Furthermore, the operation meets clear geopolitical objectives:
– Shield Israel against its main regional enemy.
– Divide the Middle East by deepening the gap between Shiites and Sunnis.
– Reactivate and modernize the Abraham Accords, bringing Israel even closer to the Arab countries of the Gulf.
In this sense, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are increasingly considering actively join operations against Iran. After receiving Iranian missile and drone attacks, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have hardened their stance.
Diplomatic sources indicate that it is “only a matter of time” before Saudi Arabia enters the war, and the Emirates are already studying direct actions against Iranian missile installations. Their patience has run out and they see Tehran’s military weakening as a historic opportunity to reduce the long-term threat.
Three Europes, one vulnerability
The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has exposed the deep internal fractures of the European Union, which is today divided into three blocs with almost incompatible interests.
The block geoeconomic —made up of Germany, France, Italy and Spain— lives terrified by the threat of deindustrialization. For these manufacturing powers, a prolonged energy shock would mean “the death knell” for their sectors chemical, steel and automotive. Its absolute priority is immediate de-escalation and they reject any measure that worsens the energy shortage.
The block atlantic security —led by Poland and the Baltics— celebrates the weakening of Iran as an indirect victory against the Tehran-Moscow axis, the main supplier of drones and ballistic technology to Putin. However, they face the dramatic “short blanket dilemma“: The more Washington gets involved in the Middle East, the less weapons, money and attention will be left for Ukraine.
The block obstructionist —headed by Viktor Orbán’s Hungary and Slovakia— uses his right of veto as a blackmail weapon. He has just blocked again the macroloan of 90,000 million euros to kyiv and demands energy exemptions in exchange for your support. Orbán is aware that, without the simultaneous support of Russia and the United States, his chances of re-election would be minimal.
Although the other 27 leaders strongly supported the summit’s conclusions, the Hungarian veto again paralyzed the decision. Europe continues to speak with one voice… only when Hungary allows it.
Europe, between pragmatism and ambition
There are no magic or quick solutions, but four concrete ways to confront this unprecedented crisis are being privately discussed in the corridors of Brussels:
Russian temporal pragmatism.- Europe could delay total embargoes on Russian gas and oil, tolerate triangulated imports through India and Turkey, and allow a limited flow of Russian gas to prevent the price in the TTF hub from sustainably exceeding €75/MWh. It is an uncomfortable and politically toxic option that no one admits in public, but that many governments consider inevitable in the short term to protect their industry.
Southern axis and accelerated diversification.- Urgently strengthen the Mediterranean-African corridor, increase purchases of Azeri gas through Turkey and consolidate energy alliances with new producers in the South Atlantic, especially Guyana and Brazil. The objective is to reduce dependence on conflicting routes and diversify sources outside the Persian Gulf and US control.
European buyers cartel.- Reactivate and make the joint gas purchasing mechanism mandatory, acting as a unified block of 450 million consumers. In this way, Europe would stop competing internally and could negotiate long-term contracts with greater force against Washington and Asian traders, preventing Texas from setting prices.
Nuclear renaissance and internal energy sovereignty.- Bury once and for all the antinuclear dogmas of the past, decisively bet on small modular reactors (SMR), massively accelerate renewables and the electrification of the industry. Not only for climatic reasons, but as an imperative for strategic and military survival in an increasingly hostile world.
The March 19 summit promoted the “One Europe, One Market” agenda to gain competitiveness and strategic autonomy, although the specific deadlines remain too vague.
The hardest lesson
Today, intimidated by mercantilist powers like China, Russia and an increasingly transactional United States, Europeans are learning an uncomfortable truth: weakness invites contempt. The war was never just a distant episode. As satirist Karl Kraus wrote, “war is a misfortune, but the greatest misfortune is that some refuse to hear about it“.
Europe has a formidable economic capacity—almost 18% of the world’s GDP with only 5.5% of the population—, but it still lacks political cohesion and quick decision instruments. The rule of unanimity in foreign policy It has become a glass ceiling that paralyzes its action. Energy dependence has not disappeared: it has simply shifted from Russia to the United States, and is now threatened by a third front in the Middle East.
Without moving towards qualified majority decisions in foreign affairs, without achieving true energy and defense autonomy, and without a sustainable strategy for Ukraine that reconciles principles with pragmatism, Europe runs the real risk of becoming an irrelevant industrial periphery in a world that no longer waits for anyone.
Europe, still divided over the US-Iran conflict, held an urgent meeting of Energy Ministers on March 31, 2026 to coordinate its response to the energy crisis. Risks such as supply disruptions, the possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz and rising prices were addressed.
The proposed measures include reducing consumption, strengthening gas reserves and stabilizing markets. However, the EU once again limits itself to technical and voluntary actions, without overcoming its divisions nor move towards real strategic autonomy.
Alesia Slizhava has a doctorate in Political Science and a degree in International Law.
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