“We have a defense treaty with Japan. If Japan is attacked, we will fight. If America is attacked? The Japanese will do nothing, they will just watch on Sony TV.”
- Donald Trump – June 2019
The words spoken by US President Donald Trump during his first presidential term on the sidelines of the G20 summit hosted by the Japanese city of Osaka at the time were not just a passing joke or a slip of the tongue. For the Japanese, the phrase revealed the fragility of an assumption that had persisted since 1947, that the American protection umbrella would always remain open.
The statement, issued by the head of the American state and in the heart of Japanese territory, seemed to be a call to rethink the security arrangements that have governed the relationship between the two countries for more than seven decades. From that moment, something changed in Japan’s security calculations.
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After decades of its strict adherence to the “pure defense” doctrine, Tokyo had to reevaluate the foundations of its national security, not as a subordinate to American protection, but as a power that possesses the initiative in the face of the escalating threats from North Korea and China.
Three years after that date, specifically in December 2022, Japan officially announced its shift from a “pure defense” doctrine to possessing a “counter-strike” capability, as part of an updated concept of self-defense.
This shift came within a new national security strategy, which described missile attacks as a “tangible threat,” and stressed that developing the ability to direct pre-emptive strikes against aggression launch centers has become an indispensable measure to ensure the minimum level of protection.
With this declaration, Japan turned a page that had extended since the end of World War II, as it was restricted by the “Peace Constitution,” specifically its ninth article, which stipulates that “the Japanese nation forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” These are restrictions under which Tokyo refrained from developing explicitly offensive weapons, such as ballistic missiles or… Strategic bombers, and committed not to use force except in the event of a direct attack.
What is noteworthy is that this transformation is not limited to the political or security level, but rather is accompanied by a change in the popular mood within Japan, as a recent opinion poll shows that about 60% of the Japanese now support possessing the ability to “counter-strike,” a percentage of support that was not possible only a decade ago.
“Type-12″… longer range and smaller footprint
In this context, long-range missiles form the focus of Tokyo’s new defense strategy, as implementing a “counter-strike” requires possessing precise offensive means capable of penetrating the enemy’s depth. To achieve this, Japan has allocated significant investments during the current decade to build and modernize its arsenal, whether through local development projects or through arms partnerships with its allies.
One of the most prominent of these projects comes in the form of developing an improved version of the Type-12 missile, which is an anti-ship missile produced by the Japanese company Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. It was originally used to repel short-range naval threats (about 200 kilometers), and its range has been increased to reach about 900 kilometers, allowing it to cover most of North Korea’s territory and large parts of the Chinese coast, in the case of Launched from land bases on the island of Kyushu or in the southern Japanese islands.
Initial experiments with the improved model showed promising results, prompting the Ministry of Defense to accelerate plans for mass production, in preparation for beginning to supply ground units with it late this year.
This modernization represents a qualitative leap in Japan’s defense capabilities, as it was designed in a way that reduces its radar footprint thanks to a more streamlined external structure, which makes it more difficult to monitor and track it. It is also equipped with advanced guidance technologies, including inertial driving with continuous updates via the Global Positioning System (GPS), ensuring the accuracy of the path.
In addition, the missile features a smart targeting head, which is the part responsible for tracking the target and directing the strike with high accuracy. The “intelligence” of this head is due to the fact that it contains an active radar with an electronic scanning array (AESA), which enables it to monitor and track moving targets, whether sea or land, and deal with them even in electronic jamming environments or complex weather conditions.
According to the Procurement, Technology and Logistics Agency, the improved version of the Type-12 is designed so that it can be launched from multiple platforms, giving it great flexibility and the ability to carry out offensive missions beyond traditional ground launch.
Compared to similar global systems, this missile is close in its characteristics to the British-French “Storm Shadow/Scalp AG” and Norwegian “NSM” missiles, whether in terms of low radar signature design or the ability to direct precise strikes, but it surpasses them in engagement range and diversity of launch methods, which enhances its operational value within the Japanese counter-strike strategy.
However, experts believe that the main weakness of the Type-12 lies in the quality of its warhead, as it was designed primarily to attack ships, which makes it less effective in destroying runways or fortified concrete shelters.
To deal with this gap, it may require developing specialized munitions, or relying on medium-range hypersonic and ballistic missiles, capable of penetrating solid fortifications and neutralizing vital targets.
Japanese program that exceeds the speed of sound
This prompted Japan to begin developing the “High-Velocity Glide Missile” (HVGP) system in 2018, a mobile missile attack system belonging to the class of hypersonic weapons, which travel at speeds exceeding five times the speed of sound (Mach 5), giving them an ultra-short arrival time and greater chances of bypassing enemy defenses.
Unlike traditional ballistic missiles that follow a specific, predictable path, glide missiles have the ability to maneuver within the atmosphere during flight, which makes it difficult for traditional air defense systems to determine their path and intercept them, because the missile can change its direction and altitude at critical moments, causing great confusion in radar calculations and interception systems.
Japan carried out the first actual test of the system in 2024, in parallel with the establishment of two specialized battalions to operate it, one in Kyushu, to secure the southern and western fronts against China and North Korea, and the other in Hokkaido to strengthen the northern defenses.
The choice of these two islands reflects the strategic geographic dimension of the program, as Kyushu is located at the southernmost point of the main islands of Japan, near the East China Sea and the Korean Peninsula, which gives it an ideal location to cover any potential threats from the south and west.
As for Hokkaido, in the far north, it overlooks the Sea of Okhotsk and is adjacent to areas of Russian influence, making it an advanced line of defense against any northern movements, and ensuring the distribution of missile capabilities on two main fronts to protect the entire strategic perimeter of the country.
According to reports, Tokyo has completed an initial version of the system with a range of 500-900 kilometers, with the aim of putting it into service during the current year. This model works with solid fuel, which propels the projectile to high altitudes before it begins sliding towards its target within the atmosphere.
As for the advanced version, which is scheduled to enter service by 2030, it will have a range of about 3,000 kilometers, thanks to its reliance on “slip wave” technology.
This technology is based on a physical phenomenon that occurs when flying at speeds exceeding the speed of sound, whereby a shock wave is formed in front of the body, which is a dense layer of compressed air that resembles an invisible wall.
While traditional designs try to resist this wave, the rocket is designed to take advantage of it like a surfer who takes off with the force of the wave, giving it additional lift that extends flight time and increases range.
The two versions are scheduled to be equipped with advanced guidance systems, combining satellite navigation and inertia, with radar sensors and infrared tracking to ensure accuracy of hit in various circumstances, in addition to the possibility of equipping them with armor-piercing or high-explosive warheads, depending on the nature of the target.
A “counter-strike” against a nuclear power?
Japan’s insistence on accelerating the acquisition of hypersonic missile capabilities reflects its deep awareness of the inadequacy of its current arsenal to keep up with the requirements of any large-scale regional conflict, especially if China is a party to it.
According to a report issued by the Chinese Maritime Studies Institute, the Chinese Navy’s aircraft carrier strategy relies on a three-layered defense system, which gives it an increased ability to carry out long-range “blue water” operations, with a great deal of independence and self-protection.
This Chinese system starts from the external defense zone (between 185-400 kilometers from the Chinese border), and is operated by submarines and J-15 fighters equipped with long-range strike capabilities, intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Followed by the Central Defense Zone (between 45-185 kilometers), which is secured by destroyers and frigates equipped with advanced radars, in addition to vertical launch systems integrated into the hull of ships, as well as anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Then the inner defense zone, protected by point defense systems to intercept and destroy nearby threats, as well as weapons to deal with any threat that succeeds in penetrating the previous layers.
In the face of a complex defense structure of this level, Tokyo believes that the possession of hypersonic missiles, with their tremendous speed and maneuverability, constitutes a decisive tool in penetrating integrated defense systems and reaching high-value targets, whether inside China or against the North Korean nuclear arsenal, in a way that supports the effectiveness of the Japanese counter-strike strategy.
However, this effectiveness clashes, on the other hand, with the reality of North Korea’s capabilities, as Pyongyang possesses a nuclear arsenal distributed on land and sea platforms, including short-, medium- and long-range ballistic missiles, in addition to naval launch systems and solid fuel missiles that can be concealed and launched quickly, reducing the chances of targets being detected or destroyed before launch. Mobile platforms and ballistic submarines provide high maneuverability, while solid fuel reduces preparation time from hours to minutes, which limits the effectiveness of early warning.
As for fixed Korean facilities, such as Yongbyon, they are deeply fortified, some of which are underground or in mountainous terrain, which makes targeting them precisely extremely difficult, while the risk of nuclear retaliation remains if the strike fails. Therefore, any Japanese counter-strike strategy against North Korea remains severely constrained, and even hypersonic missiles or advanced guidance systems will not guarantee the complete neutralization of the arsenal in a short time.
This is confirmed by Masashi Murano, a research fellow at the American Hudson Institute, who believes that Japan’s current, or planned, capabilities rely exclusively on conventional missile systems in light of its lack of nuclear weapons, which makes achieving effective deterrence against a nuclear-armed opponent, such as China or North Korea, an extremely difficult goal, even with notable progress in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Targeting and precision targeting techniques.
This is due, according to Morano, to the fact that carrying out a “counter-value” strike using conventional forces, with a level of destruction approaching nuclear weapons, would require huge quantities of ammunition and launchers, which is almost impossible for the Japanese forces, which are already suffering from a severe shortage of ammunition stocks.
Struggling with the readiness gap
As for China, in addition to its nuclear assets, it possesses a huge missile arsenal that covers most of East Asia and the Pacific, supported by air and sea superiority, manifested in aircraft carriers and a modern fleet of destroyers and frigates.
In the face of this growing imbalance in the balance of power, Japan is counting on long-range missile strikes to disable the opponent’s capabilities and launch platforms very early in any conflict, with the aim of buying time and complicating his escalation calculations, before he is able to carry out a decisive opening strike.
But this approach raises political and security challenges, as China has expressed its opposition to Japan’s deployment of long-range missiles in Kyushu, warning of their destabilizing effect. The location of these missiles in the southern islands makes them early targets in the event of a confrontation, which raises concerns among local communities who fear that their areas will become the front line of the conflict, and demand security guarantees and anti-missile defense systems near the launch sites as a condition for accepting them.
In addition, Japan’s missile plans face other internal challenges, most notably the need for local manufacturing programs to take additional years before entering actual service, as reports indicated that the deployment of an advanced version of the glide missile program may be behind schedule, which imposes a time gap in operational readiness.
This delay prompted Tokyo to resort to foreign arms deals to speed up filling the shortage, but these contracts in turn face obstacles, such as delayed delivery of some systems, or Japan being forced to modify their specifications, as happened in the “Tomahawk” missile deal, where it replaced part of the newer versions with older ones to ensure their early arrival and avoid production bottlenecks.
According to reports, Tokyo concluded a contract worth $1.7 billion to purchase 400 American Tomahawk Block 5 cruise missiles, but its desire to accelerate the acquisition of this capability, rather than waiting for the newer versions, prompted it to include in the deal a number of older Block 4 missiles.
Block-5 features a range of approximately 1,600 kilometers, the ability to fly at low altitude, and the ability to maneuver to strike high-value land and sea targets.
According to the announced plan, Maritime Self-Defense Forces destroyers equipped with the Aegis system will begin deploying these missiles, starting this year, with all eight destroyers being fully armed by 2027.
Moreover, Tokyo seeks to possess the American JASSM-ER long-range air-to-ground missiles, which are guided missiles that can be launched from American fighters such as the F-35 and F-15, with the possibility of adapting them to be launched from Kawasaki C-2 transport aircraft or Japanese Mitsubishi F-2 fighters.
It is noteworthy that the range of “Jassim” exceeds 900 kilometers, giving Japanese aircraft the ability to strike distant targets from outside the range of enemy defenses, without leaving the national airspace.