In New York, during the last week of the United Nations General Assembly, at the end of September, the dominant feeling was that of a world in search of a compass. In the hallways there was less talk about open wars than about another diffuse battle: that of multilateralism to survive.
China ruled with a perfectly woven power agenda. Its prime minister, emissary of a Xi Jinping who no longer needs to participate in mortal flesh to make himself felt, calmly presented his thesis of practical global governance, a combination of efficiency, development and formal respect for sovereignty. A cold speech, but with overwhelming poise: an offer of order in a world exhausted of confusion.
He contrasted Europe, which arrived out of rhythm. Without story, without focus and, above all, without unity. On the margins of the Assembly, what drew attention was not what the EU voices said, but their radical division regarding Gaza. Even above the disparate statements, silences resonated. It was a sad spectacle, a crude reflection of a reality as profound as it was poorly assumed: the lack of coordinated synderesis towards the Middle East.
With a Spanish prism, this drama – unfortunately instrumentalized by the Executive and its entourage, condemning to the dark side of History anyone who did not chant “genocide”, spuriously erected as a party slogan – was the subject of a seminal intervention by King Felipe VI at the great annual UN ceremony. It formed the basis of a healthy reunion of dispersed and dispersed positions.
With a collective continental perspective, however, the region is reduced to a succession of crises fought from the portfolio, grandiose demonstrations and mass gatherings, in a mixture of commiseration for engulfing tragedies and bad historical conscience; without grasping that in each one part of our own balance is resolved.
The summit held on Monday the 13th in Sharm el-Sheikh was attended by several heads of state and community government – including Pedro Sánchez – and the president of the European Council, António Costa. Trump, monopolizing the hosting role, greeted them individually with identical emphasis – a gesture of symbolic parity that placed them all in a purely ancillary status under his baton. Thus, the EU image was diluted in the multiplicity of figures projected as merely decorative on a stage whose reason for being was to show the world who sets the pace in the Middle East.
It is worth remembering that the EU, with fewer common powers under the Treaty, did take the initiative in the past. The Union was the architect and custodian of the agreement with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actionsigned in 2015 to limit the ayatollahs’ nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions), one of the few multilateral diplomatic successes of the 21st century. And, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the EU played a constant role; Examples are the Madrid Conference of 1991 (indisputable contribution to the necessary understanding between Israel and its neighbors), or the Middle East Quartet (which created the EU in 2002 together with the UN, the US and Russia to promote the two-state solution). Always, it is true, under the logical American leadership: «US cooks, we do the dishes» was – I can attest – a recurring complaint, even exaggerated. Today, not even that. The only European with a substantive presence is Tony Blair, no longer as an EU voice, but as a private and controversial mediator.
At this juncture, Trump’s project shone under the sign of hope for an immediate ceasefire, the release of hostages and the exchange of Palestinian prisoners, materializing the initial stage. But his vision of what will come next is deliberately vague: it does not clearly specify who will govern Gaza, nor how local administration will be reestablished, nor the role Israel will play in its security. This ambiguity aims to maintain flexibility in the negotiations, although it opens potential doors to dangerous actors, such as Iran.
As far as the EU is concerned, the institutions must face the dilemma of taking action in the configuration that is being forged, or remaining in the current declaratory and suffragan attitude in the face of the outcome. We are witnessing the withdrawal of “Brussels” towards what is urgent. Superficially, it is justified by the systemic dislocation we suffer. The conversation is limited to three axes: defense, Ukraine and immigration. The first two absorb all the political impetus; the third, fear and ghosts. It is not just about paying to contain migratory flows, but about expressing strategic ambition and tactical horizon; prevent the urgent from devouring what is (also) fundamental.
Thus, the board is reorganized without us. China, with its Global Governance Initiative, has gone from observer to architect. It doesn’t preach ideals, it promises results. Its diplomats tour that geography with concrete proposals – infrastructure, energy, telecommunications – while Europe gets lost between conditionalities and communications. Beijing understands what we forget: in international politics, influence begins with presence.
And Türkiye, the uncomfortable next interlocutor par excellence, once again occupies the attention of the foreign ministries due to its deployment in the area. Member of NATO, eternal candidate for the Union, essential partner and problematic partner, Ankara counts on all fronts. It plays a notable role in Syria and its transition, supports migratory routes and serves as a mediator in conflicts where Europe no longer figures. Pretending that it is just a “third party” (excluding NATO) is not knowing anything. Without Ankara there is no European policy towards Syria, nor towards immigration, nor towards the eastern Mediterranean.
The EU cannot ignore the Middle East, because the Middle East does not ignore Europe. It is our energy and our maritime security; They are our societies and our borders; It is our legitimacy when we talk about International Law. If we give up being actors, we will continue as paymasters and little else. The path is not through grandiloquence, but through clear priorities. We must define a common policy towards Israel and Palestine; build a firm and frank strategic relationship with Türkiye; and overcome pure transactionalism with the southern Mediterranean. The EU must offer more than checks and control mechanisms; A comprehensive and sustained policy is imposed.
The future of our coexistence project is not only discussed on the Ukrainian plains or in the offices of Brussels. It is also measured in the ability to understand and commit to the closest neighborhood, that arc that goes from the Maghreb to the Levant. If the EU wants to influence the world (and there is no viable replacement at the collective level) it must start by stopping behaving as a spectator paganini in its own theater, powerless in the face of the contradictions of the capitals. Looking without seeing in the Middle East is not prudence; It is evidence of weakness and fragmentation.
And the future of the European project is at stake in the perception of weakness and fragmentation.