The Persian Civilization is so old that 2500 years ago it was at war with the Greek City-States. But the arrival of Islam, in the 7th century, was so overwhelming that at a given moment the Arabic language, riding alongside the new religion, seemed to threaten the old Persian language, with Indo-European roots and, to a certain extent, the cultural matrix itself.
Anyone who has visited Tehran has certainly seen the statue of Ferdusi, who lived a thousand years ago, the man who, with his work, The book of Kingsrescued the Persian, reducing the influence of the Arab as much as possible. Letters were even added to the alphabet brought from the Arabian Peninsula. Iranians, proud of their multi-millennial culture, place great value on Ferdosi. They agree that such a statue, built during the time of the shah, is well deserved, maintained by the ayatollahsand which appears not to have been affected by the war that the United States and Israel have been waging since February 28 against the Islamic Republic of Iran. At least, there is no news of damage caused by the bombs dropped on Tehran in recent weeks.
We do not, however, need to go back a thousand years to find signs of conflict between the Persian and Arabic worlds in this clash of languages, very symbolic, if we think that Arabic is the language of Quran. Not even 500 years, if we prefer to emphasize, in this rivalry, the role of Shi’ism imposed as an official religion by the Safavid dynasty in the 16th century and which, to this day, makes Iran the great colossus of the minority branch of Islam, one that is in favor of the prophet Muhammad having succeeded his cousin and son-in-law Ali and, thus, the descendants via his daughter Fátima.
Although there are Shiite populations, especially in Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain, the vast majority of the Arab world is Sunni. He follows tradition, accepting that, after the prophet, his companion in struggle, Abu Bakr, one of the first Muslims, was elected as caliph.
Since the beginning of the current war, Arab countries, namely the monarchies of the Persian Gulf (Arabian, they will say), have been attacked by Iran, which is making them pay for the alliances established in the past with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and, now, with the United States. At first, it seemed that the targets were the bases where American troops are based, but then missiles and drones were launched against airports, energy installations, sometimes hotels and residential areas. The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia have been attacked, with Oman, a traditionally mediating country (and Ibadite, a small branch of Islam), being mostly spared. But the greatest damage inflicted on Arab countries is the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, which prevents the export of 20% of the world’s oil and natural gas. Added to this is the attempt to destroy the gradually built image of a cosmopolitan land, financial center and tourist attraction, which countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and, more recently, Saudi Arabia sought to create, thinking about the post-oil era.
The major airlines in the Gulf, a symbol of the success of the cosmopolitanism strategy, now face an enormous challenge, hoping that the war will end quickly, and that everything will return to normality (?) of a permanent but hidden tension, of localized regional conflicts, but not of open war between Americans and Israelis and Iranians.
Attacking neighbors, such as blocking the Strait of Hormuz, may have been an effective Iranian strategy in terms of complicating American action, creating a regional and global impact that creates a lot of pressure on Donald Trump. The American president is now hesitant about whether or not to end the war, but if he does so, he leaves a lot open, namely the future of the Middle East. And if Israel can come out of this conflict in an advantageous position, as even if Iran survives the regime is weaker, the Gulf monarchies have realized that they are at the mercy of an enemy that sees them as agents of American interests and that will not hesitate to challenge kings, emirs and sultans.
However, this was perhaps the Iranian regime’s biggest mistake in the medium term: having created in its Arab neighbors the conviction that the total defeat of Iran is necessary, which is why they put pressure on Trump in this sense, even at the expense of the immediate interest in a peace (or ceasefire) that would allow the export of oil and natural gas to resume.
It is not even out of the question for retaliation against Iran by the United Arab Emirates, the most attacked Gulf country, and others, if the attacks continue. And weapons purchases in recent years show that they have, in theory, strong military capacity.
Even the strategy of Arab pressure on the UN Security Council, whose monthly presidency falls to Bahrain, to authorize the use of force against Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz, shows that there is still caution, either to not suffer more destruction from Iran, or to not be seen as Israel’s partners in the war. At the same time, there are reports of pressure on the United States to see the job through to the end with regard to Iran, be it the elimination of the nuclear program, the end of the regime, or, at the very least, a weakening of the traditional rival so that it, whose 90 million inhabitants are greater than the combined population of the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, ceases to constitute a threat for a long period.
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