“Turkey is no longer just a temporary mediator, but has become a major player and one of the architects of the new order,” is how Oded Elam, former head of the Mossad’s counter-terrorism unit, described the Turkish role that recently emerged in the ceasefire agreement negotiations in the Gaza Strip.
Turkey, which was involved early in the crisis, was not a major party in the negotiations, which continued for nearly two years, under joint Qatari-Egyptian sponsorship.
However, it succeeded in making a difference when it threw its weight into the negotiations, participating with Cairo and Doha, until a ceasefire was reached, which earned it repeated praise from the US President, Donald Trump, most recently in his speech at the peace conference held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, where he appreciated the role of the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in reaching the agreement, of which Türkiye is one of the main guarantors.
This clear harmony between Washington and Ankara, and to be more precise between Trump and Erdogan, sparked a state of anxiety within the occupying state, as Oded Elam confirmed, “Erdogan, with Trump’s support, has the ability to turn the crisis into an opportunity, and he has done so again.”
Israeli concern is also closely linked to Turkey’s expected role the day after the war stops, in terms of security arrangements, reconstruction, and qualifying the new administration that will take over the affairs of the Gaza Strip.
Israeli concerns were expressed by Noa Lazemi, an expert at the Misgav Institute for National Security, saying:
“Including Türkiye in the Gaza agreement means recognizing Turkey as an influential Sunni power, and accepting the fact that comprehensive regional agreements, especially on the Palestinian issue, cannot be reached without Türkiye’s participation.”
Tel Aviv realizes that Turkish involvement in the file will differ fundamentally from its Iranian counterpart, which has not gained popular acceptance in the region, given the sectarian differences that have expanded over the last two decades, in addition to the wrong Iranian policies against countries in the region, such as Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.
But the matter is very different with Turkey, as its diplomacy has succeeded in recent years in restoring relations with the countries of the region, which were affected by the Arab Spring revolutions. Since then, Ankara has worked to strengthen that relationship, and the war crisis in Gaza was an opportunity for serious joint work.
Hence, Israel is well aware that Türkiye will not face the same obstacles that hindered Iran. We find Israeli counter-terrorism expert, Eli Carmon, warning that the situation “will be another threat to Israel in the long term, in addition to the Syrian threat.”
Probing the depths of Israeli fears will only be possible by anticipating some features of the Turkish strategy towards the Gaza Strip, and the region in general, during the next stage.
Maintaining the sector
The first feature of the Turkish strategy, which clashes with Israeli plans, is the necessity of preserving the Gaza Strip with its population and its resistance, even if its weapons are disarmed, frozen, or handed over in the worst-case scenario.
Turkey views this resistance as an advanced line of defense, not only for Palestine but also for Anatolia, as Erdogan likened it about a year and a half ago to the “Milli Forces,” or the national resistance movement that was the forefront of the war of independence that the Turks fought after World War I.
Therefore, Ankara was not expected to allow this resistance to disintegrate, but in light of the war of extermination launched by Israel against the residents of the Gaza Strip, it was necessary to deal with reality by working to stop the massacre, even at the expense of freezing the resistance now.
Türkiye went through similar circumstances in Syria, when it was forced to engage in the Astana process and the de-escalation agreement. In order to preserve the “bad” conditions that the Syrian revolution had reached at that time, in the hope of not being drawn into more strategic losses that could have led to the loss of Idlib, the last stronghold of the revolution, and the forcing of nearly four million Syrians to emigrate into the unknown.
Freezing the situation in northern Syria allowed the revolution to reorganize its ranks again and seize the opportunity of profound regional changes to begin the process of liberation and overthrow the Assad regime.
Hence, Tel Aviv fears that Ankara may not be interested – if it is present in the Gaza Strip – with dismantling the resistance infrastructure, but rather it may do the opposite, as it did before in Syria with the revolutionary forces.
Türkiye’s keeping the population of the Gaza Strip, and preventing their displacement, also represents a blow to the Israeli plan aimed at displacing the population and allowing the settlement movement to begin.
Turkish return
If things go as planned, Turkey will participate with forces in the international force that will carry out tasks in the Gaza Strip.
The presence of Turkish forces for the first time after more than a hundred years is the last thing Israel could have imagined. According to Elie Carmon’s estimates, Türkiye is “a much stronger country militarily than Iran.”
Carmon recalls that the Turkish regime “is fighting Israel economically, preventing ships from docking in its ports, preventing military aircraft from passing, boycotting Israel in all fields, trying to unite Arab forces against it, obstructing Israel’s activities in gas exploration, and signing an agreement with Libya to close the Israeli economic zone.”
In addition to what Carmon mentioned, the world recently followed how Erdogan prevented the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, from participating in the peace conference, after the Turkish president insisted on not landing his plane in Sharm El-Sheikh, and threatened to cancel his participation if Netanyahu participated, and the crisis did not end until he canceled participation as was previously scheduled.
With this severe tension in the relationship between the two countries, Israel cannot bear to see Turkish forces on its southern borders, which would represent a counter-strategic step by Erdogan, who had been warning more than a year ago that any Israeli forces would approach his country’s borders.
In addition, some Israeli estimates say that “if the Turks become part of a military force inside Gaza, and Turkish construction companies participate in rebuilding the Strip, Hamas will remain a dangerous element inside Gaza.” This is according to Elie Carmon’s vision.
New regional cooperation
Cooperation with neighboring countries is one of the most important approaches that Türkiye has employed to deal with the war crisis in Gaza.
Türkiye did not act alone, but through joint cooperation between the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, from which a ministerial committee emerged from several Arab and Islamic countries.
This cooperation was crowned by Turkey’s tripartite coordination with Egypt and Qatar regarding ceasefire negotiations, as this coordination succeeded in getting the Trump administration to end the war and begin the reconstruction phase, according to the US President’s confirmation at the Sharm El-Sheikh summit.
According to Oded Elam, “Over the past decade, Turkey has not only worked to strengthen its naval power with advanced submarines, light aircraft carriers, and naval weapons capable of attack, but it has also worked to increase its cooperation with other countries in the Middle East.”
But what raises concern in Tel Aviv is that these Turkish moves come “at a time of increasing security cooperation between Türkiye and Egypt.”
The Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement, which was recently strengthened by joint naval maneuvers, is one of the important geostrategic results of the Al-Aqsa flood, as the two countries quickly turned the page on past differences and quickly engaged in coordinated action to confront the Israeli threats that went beyond Gaza to the countries of the region.
Hence, it is expected that Ankara will seek to strengthen this regional cooperation – especially with Egypt – and adopt a consistent strategy to deal with Gaza after the war, while Tel Aviv will seek to spoil this cooperation and prevent its continuation.
After Gaza
The effort that Turkey made to stop the war in Gaza, which was appreciated by Trump, and for which he thanked Erdogan several times, most recently in front of the audience at the Sharm El-Sheikh conference, Ankara will work to employ it to build a strategy that addresses its security concerns and strengthens its regional presence.
Syria will be the most prominent arena to achieve this, as Türkiye will work to end the threats of the Syrian Democratic Forces, either by peace or by war, during the remainder of the deadline granted to those forces, which is the end of this year.
Ankara expects Washington to lift its hand from the SDF forces, especially since Trump still needs Erdogan to mediate to end the war in Ukraine, given his distinguished relationship with both sides of the crisis.
Ending this thorny security file will contribute to the Syrian state’s security and defense recovery, which will have a positive impact on the Suwayda file, in favor of Damascus.
These scenarios are not wanted by Israel, which realizes that the recovery of the Syrian state, and the building of its security and defense capabilities with the help of Türkiye, will represent a direct threat to it, in light of the ongoing Turkish-Syrian cooperation.
Finally
Expressing the concerns of the Israeli elite, Shai Gal says:
“The next stage is not military but cognitive. Israel imposes reality before Doha and Ankara reformulate it in the language of Hamas. If they are allowed to sit at the table, its cessation will become a defeat; if they are excluded, a new order may emerge: overwhelming victory, sovereignty without intermediaries, and permanent deterrence.”
But they sat through the first phase of the agreement, while challenges remain in the coming phases.
The opinions expressed in the article do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera Network.