Will Trump deter “rapid support” and stop the Sudan war? | policy

After its success in putting the crisis in Gaza on the first path leading to stopping the war there and ending the conflict with a settlement satisfactory to Tel Aviv, and acceptable to Hamas and other resistance factions and to the Palestinian Authority through Trump’s plan to stop the Israeli war on Gaza, which has already entered into force, it is expected that the Trump administration will seek to place the war in Sudan at the forefront of its agenda for resolving conflicts and bringing peace to areas of tension and chronic conflicts around the world.

This is part of a declared general trend of the Trump administration, which did not hide its motives of adopting a policy of extinguishing raging fires to achieve goals that are primarily in Trump’s favor and his aspiration to win the Nobel Peace Prize, and to achieve what the Biden administration was unable to achieve in order to gain more points in the competitive race between Republicans and Democrats.

Unless dramatic events and a major escalation occur on the Russian-Ukrainian war front, the Trump administration will not be more preoccupied than it is now with the diaries of this war, and it is expected to pay more attention and focus to the issue of the war in Sudan.

Especially since the humanitarian situation in El Fasher is steadily deteriorating. Due to the prolonged siege imposed by the Rapid Support Forces on the city and its ongoing violations and war crimes against civilians and the targeting of hospitals, camps for the displaced, and places of worship, which were condemned by the United Nations, which demanded their cessation.

But the problem that will stand in the way of the Trump administration to resolve the crisis in Sudan is the large gap that is widening day after day between the American vision that was expressed several times in the recent period, and was confirmed last month on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meetings, and the Sudanese government’s vision that it announced in February of this year, and called it (the road map).

It has been emphasized repeatedly on numerous occasions by the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, as a basis for resolving the crisis, bringing peace to Sudan, and establishing the foundations of democratic civil rule there.

Prime Minister Kamel Idris referred to it in his speech before the United Nations General Assembly, recalling that Sudan had officially presented the map to the Security Council as the official vision of the Sudanese government to emerge from the crisis tunnel.

The gap and conflict between the Sudanese and American visions is represented in four basic points:

• The first; It is that the American vision equates the Rapid Support Forces with the Sudanese government and describes them as (both sides of the conflict). Moreover, this vision holds the Sudanese government responsible for the repercussions of the war, most notably the humanitarian crisis, equally with the Rapid Support Forces.

This is what the Sudanese government rejects in its entirety and believes that the Rapid Support Forces alone are responsible for these repercussions by committing documented war crimes and proven to have committed the crime of genocide against the Masalit group in West Darfur and horrific massacres against civilians in the villages of the states of Al-Jazira, White Nile and Sennar, in West and North Kordofan, and in the capital, Khartoum.

• The second point One of the points of contradiction between the Sudanese and American visions is that the Sudanese vision is based on the fact that there is no future for the Rapid Support Forces and the political group allied with it, represented by the (Samoud) group headed by resigned former Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok, in political life in Sudan, and that there is no settlement with them that will return them again to the political scene in Sudan.

The Sudanese government believes that this is a popular and popular demand that it cannot ignore. Rather, it believes that the moral, legal, and national responsibility requires it to express it, respond to it, and translate it into reality.

While on the other side, the American vision is based on the necessity and necessity for the Rapid Support Forces and their civilian ally in the (Samoud) group to be part of any possible settlement formula, and for them to be included in it as one of the two parties to the conflict, in other words, for them to be within the ruling group – whatever its form – in political life in Sudan within political and security arrangements that are agreed upon.

• The third point One of the points of conflict between the two visions – which, in my opinion, is the most complex point of disagreement because it is itself complex and thorny – is the issue of how to end the war.

The Sudanese government’s vision in this regard, stipulated in the road map, is that ending the war begins with the Rapid Support Forces laying down their weapons, lifting their siege on the city of El Fasher, and withdrawing from the areas in which they are present.

While the American vision believes that an unconditional ceasefire must be implemented, and each party remains where it is, which is what the Sudanese government rejects, and believes that it legitimizes the rebellion of the Rapid Support Forces, puts it on an equal footing with the legitimate, internationally recognized government, and gives the militia what it was unable to obtain through war.

Thus, it turns a blind eye to all its crimes and violations that it committed over the course of thirty months, the lifetime of the war so far, which puts the Sudanese government in a critical test before the people who were victims of these violations and crimes, which could lead to popular resistance rejecting the settlement, which, if it happens, will put Sudan into an even darker tunnel.

• Fourth point The last thing is that the Sudanese government believes that the American side must put more serious and stronger pressure on the regional parties supporting the Rapid Support Forces and its political ally as a correct, productive and effective approach that leads to stopping the war.

The Sudanese government firmly believes that the key to stopping the war is for these parties to stop supporting rapid support, while the American side does not appear to have any intention, as of now, to exert any kind or degree of pressure on these regional parties.

The American side has not addressed this issue. Rather, there is a noticeable avoidance of delving into it despite the Sudanese government’s continuous attacks on it in regional and international forums, and despite the abundance of information and documents provided by the Sudanese government that support its claim and confirm the involvement of these parties, in addition to what was revealed by investigative investigations conducted by several European and American press institutions on the subject.

If we add to all of this the El Fasher dilemma, over which the conflict has become of a zero-sum nature that does not accept settlement or half-solutions, it becomes clear to us how difficult it is to reach a peaceful, negotiated solution in accordance with the American vision presented now. The Rapid Support Forces are counting heavily on controlling it by force to complete its control – according to its point of view – over the Darfur region, so that it is in a comfortable and favorable position to engage in a negotiated peace process with the Sudanese government. Or continue the military confrontation, while three of the largest cities in the Darfur region are in its grip.

On the other hand, for the Sudanese government, breaking the siege of El Fasher with a military operation and defeating the Rapid Support Forces is a strategic goal, for which it has been amassing strength, equipment, and mobilization. It is a key to undermining the Rapid Support’s control over the rest of the cities of the Darfur region in the manner of falling dominoes, and then announcing the elimination of the Rapid Support.

It is a result that culminates in the success of the military campaign led by the Sudanese army against the largest armed rebellion in Sudan’s modern history. At the same time, the government achieves an important political goal, which is to complete the implementation of the road map with five points:

The first of which is launching a comprehensive national dialogue for all political and societal forces aligned with the national side, and those that have withdrawn their support for rapid support.

The second is to make the necessary amendments to the constitutional document and have them approved by national and societal forces, so that the rest of the three items of the map have been achieved in practice. It is the formation of a government of national competencies, and this was done by forming the Government of Hope headed by Kamel Idris, lifting the siege and withdrawal by the Rapid Support from the areas it controls, laying down weapons and evacuating civilian objects. These two items will not exist if the army and the forces supporting it defeat the Rapid Support Forces.

Of course, control over El Fasher, according to what is now foreseen, will not be achieved by either party except by military force alone. Therefore, according to the current military balance of power between the army and the forces supporting it, and the Rapid Support, it indicates (theoretically) a rapprochement between the two sides, as equipment, weapons, mobilization, mobilization, logistical supply, and mercenary fighters are accumulated on the side of the Rapid Support in a relentless effort to equalize power with the army.

However, in practice, the army – and the forces supporting it – also possess equipment, striking power, organization, information, and popular support, and above that, air supremacy is outweighed by the Air Force and air defense systems, as the Rapid Support Forces possess strategic and short-range drones, but they lack qualified technical personnel to operate them.

If we add to this the army’s experience in removing the Rapid Support Forces from the capital, Khartoum, and the rest of the areas that it previously controlled, it can be said that the victory in the end will be for the Sudanese army and the forces supporting it, but through a battle that the army leaders know will be the most ferocious in this war.

This explains the deliberation followed by the army in the face of the siege imposed on El Fasher. It is a tactic that has proven successful and enabled the army to win many battles in the face of rapid support. This is what Al-Burhan, after leaving the buildings of the Army General Command after five months of the war, called the term (drilling with a needle).

There is an important factor that supports the position of the Sudanese government if it engages in a dialogue with America regarding ending the war, which is that the general direction of the Trump administration’s policy in dealing with crises in the Middle East and Africa region is based on the dismantling of militias and parallel governments spread in many countries of the region in favor of legitimate, internationally recognized governments.

According to international law, international conventions and norms, the Rapid Support Forces are considered a militia that operates outside the scope of the official military establishment in the country, and therefore keeping them within the formula of an American settlement is a clear contradiction with the policy of dismantling militias adopted by the Trump administration.