Europe is trying to achieve technological superiority with a mixture of urgency, ambition and a certain amount of self-confidence. The idea is not new: it has been around Brussels for years, fueled by privacy scandals, abuse of dominance and total dependence on digital infrastructures controlled by the United States.
But what we see now is different. It’s not just regulatory rhetoric. Ex industrial policy, public money and the story more clearly: we cannot follow that we are a digital colony.
The problem is that the decision is easy. Dejar de serlo, not so much.
Europe depends on the United States for virtually all critical aspects of the digital economy. From a cloud dominated by Amazon, Microsoft and Google, continuing with advanced chips, traversing operating systems, development platforms, AI hardware, and most importantly, large consumer platforms.
Even if we believe that we are using “European” solutions, we often do it on infrastructures that are not there. In this sense, European technological supremacy is now much more aspirational than real.
European startups build their products on OpenAI or Google API because they work
The institutional response is clear: regulation on the one hand and reversal on the other. The Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act have attempted to set limits to the power of great technology.
The aim of the AI Act is to transform Europe into a world referent for the governance of artificial intelligence. And at the same time, millions of inversions in data centers, computing capacities and artificial intelligence projects “made in Europe” are being announced.
All accompanied by a discourse that insists on it strategic autonomy as a condition for security, competitiveness and finally democracy.
But there is an obvious contradiction that is hardly discussed: Europe wants independence without giving up the benefits of dependence.
Large European companies contract cloud services from mainstream providers because they are undoubtedly better, more scalable and more cost-effective in many cases. European startups are building their products on the OpenAI API or Google because those are the ones that work.
A club cannot be removed until it reduces critical vulnerability and increases resolution capacity
Governments store sensible data in infrastructures that are ultimately subject to North American legislation that guarantees absolutely nothing. And when it comes to creating European alternatives, enthusiasm usually wanes when the coasts appear, falta de escala or bureaucracy.
Spain is a good example of this ambivalence. On the one hand, if it is positioned as a hub for data centers, it attracts twists and calls for a leadership position in the field of artificial intelligence in southern Europe. In addition, this leader is built largely as an amphitheater for the infrastructures of foreign companies.
Let’s not be significant: we aspire to be better, but we celebrate when others come to deploy our infrastructure on our territory.
The key question is whether Europe can actually compete in this terrain, or if its paper goes elsewhere. Because technological superiority is not mandated, it must be built, and that requires even more than regulation and subsidies.
It requires us to embrace what we can, and above all to stand aside for our own champions of global ambition, which Europe has not always demonstrated.
For years, the continent believed that its regulatory capacity would compensate for its industrial weakness. The famous “Brussels effect”: if you can’t lead innovation, follow the rules.
Y, it partially worked. Europe has set standards in privacy, competence and now is likely to have them in artificial intelligence as well.
But regular is not the same as competing. And what I can do is obvious: to bring us into a space where we decide how technology should behave… that others desarrollan.
There is also a geopolitical element that is still present: with the imbalance in the White House, transatlantic relations are not as predictable as before. Trade tensions, political changes in the United States and growing rivalry with China Europe is obliged to replace its position.
Technological dependence only needs to be an economic problem to transform into a security problem. This changes priorities.
However, it is best to avoid a simplistic reading. Interdependence is not necessarily negative. In fact, it forms part of how the global economy works. Demanding complete self-sufficiency in technology is not only unrealistic, but also probably undesirable. The club is not removed until it reduces critical vulnerability and gain the ability to make decisions.
That means picking your fights well. Don’t want to replicate everything the big tech companies are doing. But it can be left aside for strategic areas where Europe has the wind or where it can be introduced: certain industrial applications of artificial intelligence, digital public infrastructures, open standards or models that integrate better values such as privacy or transparency.
The problem is that I need focus, coherence and above all, time. Y Europe has not always proved particularly difficult in any of these three things.
However, the discussion of technological superiority will continue to grow. It is attractive, politically viable and connects with a legitimate interest. But yes, it is not reflected in concrete decisions and above all in results, there is a risk of achieving what has often been said: a well-intentioned aspiration that clashes with the reality of a global market dominated by others.
Ultimately, the question is whether Europe wants to be technologically better. You are willing to do what is necessary to secure it. And that, as always, means things that no one seems to want to eat.
***Enrique Dans is Professor of Innovation at IE University.
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