Operation Epic fury left Iran militarily derailed: Yamenei died, Iran’s critical infrastructure was devastated, and the ability to launch missiles and drones was limited to sporadic attacks against targets of opportunity.
Tehran is not doing its job on the battlefield, resisting as best it can, while the air force is marked by the rhythm of war, with military sentiment that seems inscribed in the face of a political sentiment as incomprehensible and volatile as the rhetoric Donald Trump.
The chronology of the president’s messages explains the confusion of allies, markets and public opinion that has been thrown into the air by the end of the Iranian terror and the panic that will come after.
On February 28, minutes after the first coup against the heart of the regime, Trump addressed the Iranian people with a video that is the iconography of war, urging them to “take control” of their destiny and “restore their country” through a “radical and evil decree.”
It was classic regime change language, accompanied by a promise of universal support and an open takeover that the aim of the campaign was to provoke an internal revolution.
In a few hours, the topic began to unravel. A White House press release later revealed the destruction of the ayatollahs and shifted focus to a more limited and salable goal: the destruction of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, its military, and its ability to fund regional militias.
Trump has cemented his push to set up secret uranium enrichment facilities and ensure that “Iran will never have a nuclear weapon.”
The revolutionary epic was diluted in a matter of hours casus belli classic: nuclear fun.
The next round was with the export to Iran “Caracas model” case, the operation against Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. Trump presented it as a surgical coup that eliminates the toxic figure of the tip, preserves the state armaments, leaves the resources usable (in this case oil) and considers it a democratic outcome.
Translated into Iran, the implicit message was worrisome: not if deep democracy were to be sought, but rather to replace elites who would retain a functional power apparatus and the ability to negotiate vigorously with the West.
The slogan “Make Iran Great Again” sounds like a slogan for domestic consumption in the United States, not a real compromise with the freedom of Iranians.
However, the Pentagon has tried to assert some strategic coherence. The Defense Secretary insisted that “this is not a war of regime change” and I promise not to have “politically correct nation building and wars”in the guise of voters who donated to Trump in the White House and who do not want a repeat of Iraq or Afghanistan.
But in the same sentence he admitted that “the regime has changed and the world is better for it” and he wanted to create the conditions for the rise of his own Iranian people.
It’s not a mode change, but it is: if the target is rejected while celebrating the result.
The confusion worsened when Trump began suggesting that the United States should influence the choice of Iran’s next supreme leader.
The idea that the White House has influence over the nomination of the next Ayatollah is explosive and conceptually infantile in the Middle East. It corresponds more to logic casting de reality show which is the understanding of a complete society, traumatized by decades of dictation.
For a country with this past, for a US president to choose the next religious leader with discretion is the equivalent of confirming one’s worst fears: that Iran is not a right thing but a table in your hands.
It is worth saying: the end of the theocratic regime of the Ayatollahs is a necessary condition for Iran to aspire to a prosperous and free country. Nadie will emphasize less a system based on repression, torture and harassment, institutional anti-Semitism and the export of terrorism.
From a strictly military point of view, Iran has lost the war: its conventional capabilities are exhausted and its response is limited to missiles and drones at any moment.
But precisely because the fall (or mutation) of the regime was a historic moment for Iran and for regional stability, It is intolerable that the president is handling this moment with such a high level of improvisation.
The absence of a clear plan with limited and contested goals and an honest definition of what Washington considers “victory” has consequences that end academic debate.
Strategic uncertainty is reflected in stock volatility, plunges in European and Asian indices, oil estimates and a sense of systemic fragility. Opponents know that the Iranian regime is against their heart; What we don’t know is whether the United States is looking for an orderly transition, a chaotic implosion, or the creation of a new adversary available to Tehran.
This indeterminacy erodes the credibility of the presidency and undermines coordination with the nicknames that need to be known if there is a protectorate tomorrow de factomaquillada islamic republic or negotiated transaction.
The result is the incomprehensible “Make Iran Great Again”: an empty slogan that oscillates amid the promise of liberating an oppressed people. and an attempt to manage Iran as a major asset on Washington’s geopolitical map.
If Iran truly aspires to be “great again” (free, free, prosperous, and at peace with its elders), the minimum required in the White House is a serious plan: clear goals, a long road to the next day, and considering the ability of Iranians to decide their future without paternalistic protection.
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