keys to the first agreement between Israel and Hamas for the Trump plan

The International Criminal Court (ICC) accuses both governments of war crimes and crimes against humanity, with arrest warrants; The UN Commission of Inquiry published findings of genocide by Israel.

It does not seem coincidental that the White House has pressed to close the conflict just on the second anniversary of the terrorist attack and about to announce the Nobel Peace Prize, a distinction apparently coveted by Trump. For some it sounds extravagant, but their contempt for Barack Obamawhich did receive that award.

Washington’s underlying motivations lie in the Israeli attacks on September 9 in Doha (Qatar) against members of Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement): the first Israeli blow to a Gulf power that also hosts the largest regional US base.

The aggression irritated Qatar and, as the analyst described then Giorgio Cafiero (Atlantic Council), unleashed an arms race in the Gulf and a diversification of alliances (including a first agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, a nuclear power), with approaches to Turkey and – dangerously – China, and the consideration of a more autonomous defense of the Gulf, a reflection of the collapse of trust in the United States umbrella.

With this agreement, Trump seeks the label of great negotiator and to protect a framework made in Trump: lay the groundwork now and leave the details for later. The following phases speak of a “deradicalized” Gaza and incentives for disarmament, a priority that ignores international law and Palestinian sovereignty.

And, at the same time, the tenant of the White House once again monopolizes the news cycle in Washington while displacing negative headlines, such as the shutdown of the federal government on October 1, the result of Congress failing to pass appropriations legislation for fiscal year 2026.

In achieving this first phase, whose implementation is still pending, it is also worth highlighting the intense mediation exercised by Qatar, Turkey and the host of the negotiations, Egypt, as well as by Saudi Arabia and other Arab and Muslim countries with the capacity to influence and pressure the radical Islamist group, whose popular support was already at a minimum after two years of massacres.

According to Aaron David Millerfrom Carnegie and former US negotiator, Hamas has assumed that the hostages are no longer an asset, and if it releases them, Arab countries and Washington will increase pressure on the Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu to end the war.

Some observers recognize that the plan announced by Trump and Netanyahu is “difficult to swallow” for Hamas, the authority in fact in Gaza, but necessary to take advantage of the window and stop the killing and hunger in the Strip. The priority is to alleviate civil suffering.

It’s not a perfect plan, but it’s the only one on the table. Critical analysts consider it a form of “colonialism” as they did not count on Hamas to develop it, but the terrorist group had already lost its war.

The weakness and, at the same time, the key to success is also in the imprecision of the plan, since, as I warned Michael Koplowfrom the Israel Policy Forum, hard problems such as the disarmament of the Islamist militia and the governance of the Palestinian enclave are left for later phases.

The Israeli political scientist Nadav Eyal considers that this first phase is a tactical gain for Israel, because it forces the Palestinian Islamists to give up their main lever, the hostages, while the day after will continue to be the obstacle. He also adds that, after the withdrawal of the IDF, the Israeli forces – between 200 and 600 meters beyond the “yellow line” delimited in the plan -, Tel Aviv will continue to control 53% of the Strip until the planned withdrawals continue.

In this first phase, for which Trump had initially given 72 hours, the main obstacle is that Hamas may not locate all the remains of the deceased hostages (of almost 50 it is estimated that only 20 are alive), due to the destruction caused by Israel, a point that may stall the execution of the phase and the exchanges.

Pro-Palestinian skeptical voices like Shibley Telhamifrom the University of Maryland, remember that protecting war crimes (of Israel) detracts from the Nobel Peace Prize. Others fear a technical pause without sustainable peace, such as Yousef Lovedirector of the Israel-Palestine Program at the Arab Center in Washington, who has published on social networks: “1. Trump wins his Nobel on Friday. 2. Israel recovers its hostages on Saturday. 3. The genocide continues on Sunday.”

For his part, Netanyahu can take advantage of this agreement and appropriate the story of victory, according to Axios, taking credit for it in the eyes of Israeli public opinion and responding to pressure from the families of the hostages, who include American citizens.

But with this exchange their immediate political survival is guaranteed by buying time with their far-right partners (Bezalel Smotrich e Itamar Ben-Real), which threaten the coalition; to his trial for corruption and to criticism for the security failures of October 7.

Furthermore, even accepting Phase 1, its leaks and red lines, such as the creation of a Palestinian State, leave room to hinder subsequent phases and prevent full disarmament supervised by third parties. If this phase is not met, Tel Aviv gains time to evaluate ammunition, availability and the northern front (Hezbollah), reduces the operational cost without yet conceding a political end that it does not control.

In this case, history would repeat itself: Trump feigns anger with his protégé Netanyahu to give him an advantage in the race.

If successful, Netanyahu is placed under the umbrella of Trump’s plan and allows him to distribute costs, present himself as a responsible partner and seek oxygen in the face of external criticism after the Doha fiasco and Arab irritation.

Egypt has hosted and synchronized the talks, with indirect rounds to coordinate channels and technical listings. It maintains contacts with Hamas for the security of the Sinai, although its leverage is limited.

According to Egyptian sources, Hamas demanded Israeli compliance guarantees after releasing hostages, with Cairo acting as guarantor of sequencing and verification. Its weight comes from border logistics: since 2023 it has been a reference mediator in pauses and exchanges and, by controlling humanitarian flows, it can negotiate calendars and compliance metrics.

Qatar is the main political channel with the Hamas leadership and has validated the text before Islamist militants. Doha has sent the prime minister and chancellor himself to the Egyptian table, Mohamed bin Abdulrahman Al Thaniwho has met there with Trump’s special envoy for the region, Steve Witkoffwhich consolidates the emirate as a co-guarantor of the agreement with Washington.

This also means that, after the Israeli attack in September, Qatar will continue to be essential to close any comprehensive exchange.

As for Türkiye, which hosts Hamas militants and has supported Palestine since the start of the war, the head of the Turkish secret services, Ibrahim Kalinhas been a key player in Sharm el-Sheikh.

The foreign minister Hakan Fidan He anticipated the agreement from Ankara and placed Turkey in the group of operational mediators. Kalin’s role has been to bring the opponents’ positions closer together, leverage his influence over Hamas, and keep alive the political momentum toward a ceasefire and full swap. This reinforces the perennial president Recep Tayyip Erdogan as an international leader at a time of deep economic crisis and minimal electoral support.

According to the Israeli academic Ori Goldbergthe exchange could be completed this weekend. Netanyahu will try to present it as a victory, after converting criticism of his war management into “anti-Zionism” and exploiting the narrative of genocide and hostages.

If you improve in the surveys, He could bring forward elections and continue as a “perennial candidate”. A siege mentality prevails in Israel: a broad base supports the policy in Gaza and avoids attributing responsibility for the security failures of October 7.

If this first step is carried out, peace is closer in the current escalation of an 80-year war, but not the solution to it, which would imply the creation of two States.