“You are always fucking negative! This is a victory. Accept it!”. This was the reaction to the US president, Donald Trumpto Israeli’s response Benjamin Netanyahu (“There is nothing to celebrate”) about acceptance with Hamas conditions of the Peace Plan for Gaza, According to an exclusive Barak Ravid (Axios).
Trump gave a lastimatum to Bibi: If you do not move card, you lose your support. The anger is part of the white house thrust to activate a wide exchange and a high immediate fire.
Imperfect and difficult, but the only momentum exit, according to the Washington Post, he Trump 20 points plan seeks to end the bloody War between Israel and Gaza of which on October 7 are two years old, and that began with Hamas’s terrorist attack on an already concert Israeli colonies, with a balance of 1,139 deaths and 251 kidnapped, of which today remain 48 hostages in gaza, about 20 alive.
On the Hamas side, the Ministry of Health ensures that there are more than 60,000 dead, mostly civilians, a figure accepted by Israel and the United Nations, which has described the reaction of the Netanyahu government as a disproportionate attack, in addition to qualifying the acts of both sides as war crimes, and carrying out a genocide research.
The most obvious guarantee that the plan can get ahead is precisely Trump’s pressure to Netanyahu, since the US is the main valid and supplier of weapons to Israel (according to the agreement signed by Obama barracks In 2016), with an expense only in what we have been about 12,000 million dollars, according to US government data. With Trump in front, what can go wrong?
In the agreement there are wicker to stop the bleeding, such as the exchange of hostages by Israeli prisoners and the initial withdrawal of the Israeli forces of Gaza. But without monitors with authentic executive capacity, a (national) Palestinian authority and with real power, or a “Council for Peace” that only coordinates (and not governing), the plan runs the risk of being a high the ephemeral fire with extractive reconstruction and zero political horizon.
The plan proposes three phases. Phase 1 demands High immediate fire After the confirmation of Hamas, which occurred on Friday, the Exchange of all hostagesalive or dead, for thousands of Palestinian prisoners in the hands of Israel, and the Initial withdrawal of the Israeli army to a line of withdrawal inside gaza called yellow line.
Phase 2 includes the Hamas disarmament and interim governance without Hamas (technocratic), with observers and “independent monitors” to verify each step.
And phase 3 would be the Complete withdrawal of Israelif the milestones and a reconstruction program coordinated by an international panel are met (board).
At the moment, and despite Trump’s public request to stop all bombings, Israeli attacks continued in the last hourswhich stresses the minimal confidence to start.
Hamas, which has clearly lost this war, demands Palestinians in the observation and transition bodies and does not mention disarmament in its acceptance of the plan. At the same time, the teams travel to Cairo to negotiate the operational choreography.
And while they approach the Nile, Netanyahu speaks of carnivorous reptiles: “Do not feed the crocodile”has warned the Israeli leader to European leaders whom he accuses of making concessions to terrorism, and has threatened Hamas with total annihilation if he does not fully and unconditionally accept the Trump plan.
What can go well
The main reason for everything to go well is that there is a political window to carry out phase 1: the exchange, the high fire and the initial withdrawal of Israel.
They are incentives that both Netanyahu and Hamas can “sell” to their citizens. The Reuters agency collected two keys to Trump’s mouth: “When you confirm, the high fire will be immediate”. Operatively, this unlocks the exchange and lowers the military temperature.
Second, Washington’s pressure power. The reprimand to Netanyahu is not anecdotalbut increases the political cost of not moving. Trump’s leadership story (“I have solved it”) and the thrust to both parties to advance are part of the pressure strategy, as explained Axios.
Third, this framework has the possibility of working if it runs well, as the analyst Michael Koploow indicates (Israel Policy Forum), which grants that the plan can end war if it is implemented with order. Your warning is that The hard comes after: Sustainable governance and security.
Friction points
The first friction point will be the Responsibility of independent monitors that seem to be responsible for doing all the work. Neri Zilber has raised a consensus among the main experts: that clause is the one that supports the entire “postwar order”, without mandate, confrontation rules, chain of command and coercive capacity, will be wet paper.
The second point of conflict is that the “Day later” lacks sufficient operational architecture. Hugh Lovatt (European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR) admits that the principles of the plan can be useful to curb destruction, but points out holes, such as a diffuse calendar, unclear guarantees and last -minute Israeli amendments that displace balance.
Ask for verifiable milestones (benchmarks) and explicit guarantees, and warns of the risk of consolidating the Gaza -Cisjordan separation if it is not corrected.
Third, there is a Gap between ads and facts. Despite the instruction of ceasing bombings, Israeli mortal attacks have continued. If on day 1 it does not show consistent signals – Hora del Alto el Fuego, public map of withdrawal, order of the exchange – the trust evaporates.
A truck transports a tank, on the Israeli side of the Gaza Strip.
The fourth disruptive factor is Bank. The chapter West Bank It is the great black hole: Trump has verbally demanded from Israel the non -annexation, but there are missing operational measures (Moratory of settlements, institutional relief to the ANP). Without a political thread with the West Bank, Gaza falls for “West Bank effect,” according to Lovatt (ECFR).
Finally, the composition of board For peace and the announced Presence of Tony Blair It is a reason for rejection, due to the risk of external protection, and announces “fatal failures” if the board It concentrates decisions and displaces the interim Palestinian administration. Chatham House adds an economic angle: care with a scheme where the benefits of reconstruction leave Gaza, a possibility that encourages criticism of “neocolonialism.”
What is intended for failure
In phase 1 everything can fail if they occur incidents without protocol (A rocket or incursion can freeze everything), inconsistencies between speech and land (pause ads, but with bombings).
In addition, choreography is opaque, No cessation time or withdrawal map or order order. The demand for Día 1 MILIMETRIC: Exact Time of Cessation, Public Map of the lineand clear sequence of the exchange. And a downtown that processes incidents in real time.
In phase 2, the main risk is that a verification be carried out in which the monitors observe but cannot enforce. There is also the risk of an Israeli domestic veto to return real power to the ANP in Gaza. In addition, and as indicated by Lovatt, a misalignment with the West Bank: Without brake to settlers or oxygen settlements to the ANP, everything limps.
These risks require a minimum public technical annex: with the mandate of monitors, rules of force use, chain of command and automatic sanctions against breaches, and an operational commitment to the West Bank.
Phase 3 may fail if the perception of “external government” is imposed if the board decides on the Palestinian administration. This would mean an extractive reconstruction: contracts and returns that do not stay in Gaza.
Arab countries cannot be like voiceless payers, since the agreement would lose legitimacy and cooperation. To avoid this danger, and as Chatham House suggests, board must be bounded so that coordinate and supervise (but do not govern), with a robust audit, Arab participation with full rights and rules to capture the Palestinian talent.
Egypt and the Arab axis
Egypt is the bottlenecksince he welcomes the delegations and marks the compass of the table of Cairo. If the agreement gets stuck there, everything gets stuck.
In addition, this mediation occurs while the attacks follow, which makes the basal confidence between the negotiators more expensive. Qatar and other Arab actors can join, but are asking for real Palestinian sovereignty and claim the role of the Palestinian National Authority (ANP).
They don’t want a foreign de facto government via board. In this aspect, the majority of European analysts converge.
In summary, these would be the signals to be monitored in the next few hours to see if the plan works: a Day 1 Choreographedregulation of the mandate of the monitors, the verifiable moratorium of settlements in the West Bank and the coherence of verbal ads and developments on the ground.