Violent crime in Lisbon is falling and this is a central fact in the debate on security in the capital. The figures presented by the commander of the PSP’s Lisbon Metropolitan Command, chief superintendent Luís Elias, on the 158th anniversary of Cometlis, show a 1.9% reduction in violent and serious crime in the first ten months of 2025, after a decline of 1.6% in 2024 and 2.4% compared to 2023. Arrests increased by 46.6% and crimes detected by police initiative increased 64.5%.
These numbers confirm the trend that the Government itself had already recognized in the 2024 Annual Internal Security Report: in the Lisbon district, general crime fell by 7.6% and violent and serious crime by 1.8%; in the municipality of Lisbon, general crime fell by 8.2%. In other words, Lisbon continues to be a safe city, in a country that is among the safest in Europe.
The president of Lisbon City Council, Carlos Moedas, is also in opposition. Last week, upon taking office, he demanded from the Government more PSP agents and more municipal police for the capital, repeating a coherent line of argument since at least 2023.
Security is a comfortable ground for any mayor who wants to show firmness. The problem is when the narrative no longer has a solid connection to the facts. It’s not that there’s no need for more police. We know so, because hundreds of agents were diverted to airport security and because an essential reorganization of police stations is underway that would free up resources.
The question that arises is how to reconcile these appeals with official data, which show successive reductions in the most serious crimes? How can we demand more resources if those that exist are not organized? And how can we prevent public perception from being conditioned by fragmented readings, disconnected from official statistics?
It’s not about denying problems. The Cometlis commander himself recalls that general crime rose 6.1% this year, that there are phenomena of organized crime, drug trafficking and domestic violence that require structured responses, and that the perception of insecurity can be manipulated by casuistic and sensationalist readings. But a political discourse that starts from the exception to the rule helps little. Worse: it fuels fear, distorts public perception and pressures security forces into symbolic responses rather than consistent strategies.
The balance presented by the PSP suggests that operational work – patrolling, prevention, proximity and investigations aimed at specific phenomena – has produced consistent results.
Cometlis intervenes daily in transport, schools, residential and tourist neighborhoods, in events and demonstrations, coordinating resources in very different areas. It is this fine mesh, made of visibility, proximity programs and surgical operations against trafficking and violence, that reduces violent crime and improves the daily lives of those who live and work in the metropolitan area.
Given this, It’s worth asking whether it makes sense to further burden the PSP with new investigative powers – for example, in drug trafficking or firearms crimesas has been defended by some sectors – when it is already responsible for the largest population area in the country, the security of critical infrastructures and, since 2023, also increased responsibilities at borders.
More skills without more means almost always mean less ability to do the essentials well. What impact would this change have on the balance between prevention, patrolling and proximity, which constitute much of the daily work in the metropolitan area? How can we ensure that new powers are accompanied by the necessary means, training and structures?
These are some questions that those who defend this increase in skills should think about, instead of focusing on how the PSP, GNR and PJ can cooperate to avoid overlapping functions and ensure that the investigation follows clear criteria of priority and coordination.
The answer cannot be simplistic. It is not a question of claiming privileges or exclusivity, but rather of clearly defining what powers, what resources are attributed to it and how the PSP interacts with other bodies (PJ, GNR, Public Ministry). Cooperation and institutional clarity count as much as means.
As for Carlos Moedas’ narrative – the mayor of Lisbon could and should demand better conditions for those who guarantee security in the city: decent facilities, modern equipment, affordable housing for police officers stationed in one of the most expensive areas of the country.
Interestingly, this is also what the Cometlis commander is asking the Government and local authorities for: rehabilitation of dilapidated police stations, more accommodation for young officers, vehicles, personal protection, body cameras, drones. This is the demanding agenda that truly strengthens security.
Lisbon does not need the rhetoric of a city under siege. It needs public policies that start from a rigorous diagnosis, that value the work of the security forces and that refuse the instrumentalization of fear as a governance tool.
Violent crime is falling; The challenge now is to also dispel the political noise that insists on saying otherwise. What is important is knowing how to consolidate the evolution presented by the Lisbon PSP, how to strengthen the working conditions of police officers and how to clarify the institutional framework so that each police officer can perform their functions effectively and predictably.