Tehran- In contrast to the slogans raised by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian during his election campaign about public freedoms and his refusal to use “coercion in order to impose religious values,” the announcement by the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice to form the “Chastity and Hijab Situation Chamber” brought the debate in official policies regarding the hijab back to the forefront again.
The Secretary of the Commission in the capital, Ruhollah Momen Nasab, announced the organization of 80,000 “commanders of morality” and more than four thousand and 500 trainers and judicial officers to implement the “Hijab and Chastity Law,” which had previously been approved by Parliament, stressing that these elements “could bring about a major transformation in Tehran Province.”
This decision raised a wave of questions about the feasibility of the project and its funding sources, at a time when the country is suffering from severe economic pressures, and fears of the return of what is known in Iranian society as the “morality police and plainclothes cameras” and the confrontations that accompany them in the street, given that they have previously sometimes led to massive popular protests.
Political stubbornness
Observers warn that “any harsh measure at this precise time may constitute fuel for social tensions. Security circles have previously warned that the enemy is working to incite internal strife to achieve goals that he has failed to achieve by force.”
The name of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice has always been associated with controversial projects and ideas among Iranian society. Including “clinics to treat non-wearing the hijab” and “the Hijab Guardians Project”, the latest announcement revealed a clear differentiation in positions within the regime’s institutions.
Iranian government spokeswoman Fatima Mohajerani commented on the issue, “We certainly cannot forcefully return the hijab to Iranian women, just as no one was able to remove it by force,” stressing in her weekly press conference that the government “did not allocate any budget for exceptional work like this,” in a move in which observers sense the government’s reservations about the authority’s policies and their strictness.
Abolishing the mandatory hijab law and no longer subject to financial penalties or imprisonment for violating the removal of the hijab. Abolishing the public morals police from their presence on the Iranian street.
Salute to the soul of Mahsa, who sacrificed her life because she decided to rebel against taking off the hijab in the street 3 years ago, and she was the reason for the women’s uprising against the compulsory hijab and the morality police. pic.twitter.com/KUEx6wBfDJ
— eyad.gevara (@EYAD_ATIA55) October 8, 2025
In this context, the reformist newspaper “Hum Mihin” wrote, “Although we have sufficient confidence in the government’s policy regarding women’s veils – and we recall President Pezeshkian’s refusal to implement the veil and chastity law – her disagreement with this policy or her abstention from funding it does not absolve her of responsibility,” using a striking analogy that “the system is like a ship that must be governed by coordinated leadership.”
The newspaper highlighted a historical irony that “morality police patrols are searching for a veil that they will never reach, after the veil of the young woman Mahsa Amini, who died in 2022 while being arrested by the morality police for allegedly wearing immodest clothing, has become an unattainable dream today for the owners of these patrols.”
She concluded, “Political stubbornness does not solve any crisis, but rather exacerbates it,” warning that “denying change and resisting the general will only leads to defeat and surrender,” in a clear reference to the necessity of reviewing current policies.
Religious institution
The announcement of the new project comes at a very sensitive time, as the country is still suffering from the repercussions of last June’s war, and the Persian press previously reported that the Supreme National Security Council had suspended the implementation of the “Chastity and Hijab Law” after the government confirmed its intention not to implement it, which opens the door to a constitutional crisis, as no institution has the right to prevent the implementation of a law issued by Parliament.
Two different discourses emerged within the religious institution, between an emphasis on the compulsory hijab and reservations about coercive methods. The first segment believes that no one is outside the circle of responsibility in this issue, while the other segment raises a slogan that says it is for the hijab, but against the compulsion to wear it.
For his part, Ayatollah Abbas Al-Kaabi, a prominent member of the Leadership Council of Experts, confirmed that the Iranian regime is capable of managing the issue of the hijab and chastity with smart governance and national participation, warning – in press statements – the government against abandoning its responsibilities, “The government cannot declare its indifference to the hijab.”
On the other hand, Ayatollah Masoudi Khomeini, a member of the Teachers’ Association in the religious seminary in Qom, expressed a different position, saying, “I personally strongly oppose any kind of force that we go and strike in order to impose the hijab.”
Observers in Tehran believe that although Masoudi emphasized that “the hijab is one of the obligatory matters in Islam,” his statements indicate the existence of a trend within the religious establishment that rejects coercive methods in implementing its policies.
Economy first
With the return of members of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice to the streets, the Iranian scene witnessed a remarkable interaction, as the academic and political activist Sadiq Zibakalam commented with biting sarcasm, “Today is unforgettable in terms of the progress of women in Japan and Iran.”
He pointed out in a post on the
Former MP Ali Motahhari also sent an indirect invitation to the authority, suggesting in a post on the “X” platform that it “start sending its trained members to bakeries to check for weight fraud, to gas stations to check octane adulteration, and to stores to detect high prices.”
For her part, sociologist Alia Shukr Beki warned of the dire consequences of the return of these policies, explaining that “the clothes that Mahsa Amini was wearing at the moment of her arrest were more modest than the clothes of the daughters of some officials.”
She pointed out, in an interview with ILNA news agency, that “the focus on the hijab in light of the living crises is an attempt to divert attention from the outrageous prices,” warning that “cultural pressures may lead to social and political collapse.”
In the political context, Azar Mansouri, head of the Reform Front, attacked the current hijab policies, and demanded that the religious police “submit a comprehensive report on its performance, budgets, and the results of its previous policy before any new action,” considering that “the formation of new institutions is a continuation of ineffective policies that increase the social gap and distrust.”
While these developments show the depth of division within Iranian institutions on how to deal with the hijab issue; Between a religious orientation, security reservations, and government rejection, the question remains: Which of these institutions will succeed in imposing its vision on a file that constitutes a real test of the balance of power within the Iranian regime? At a time when the current situation of the hijab is no longer “satisfactory” for the religious segment.