This means the demise of Vladimir’s godfather

Delcy Rodríguez led him to the ejection.

Probably the most repeated point will be that this is the inner comfort of Chavismo, Delcy’s consolidating force, the post-transformationalMaduro rounded shape.

That’s all to be sure, but none of these analyzes paint the full picture. To understand what happened today, you need to understand three things that are not being said out loud.

The godfather was el hombre de Rusia

This is the part that most coverage completely ignores. Even as Maduro’s guarantor within the armed forces, Padrino was the institutional center through which Moscow maintained real influence over the FANB and the rest of the Venezuelan regime.

Armament treaties, military advisors, doctrine, base overviews. Everything passed by him. Russia does not require a formal presence in Venezuela, while Padrino is sent to the defense apparatus of Miraflores.

This relationship has moved to an institutional level.

Some will argue that Russia still holds sway. He won’t follow through. yes no The Kremlin keeps the table very clear on Ukraine and cannot project significant power in a country where the United States can demonstrate that it can capture the (de facto) head of state and bring him to New York.

Russia is not going to hell with ace pelea. The Ukraine case has caused his influence on the world, including Latin America, to quietly collapse. Cuba is a disaster on the verge of following Venezuela’s footsteps, Nicaragua is isolated, and in general the entire anti-imperialist force that Chávez built is functionally dead as a bloc.

Remover and Padrino is an institutional formalization of something that was geopolitically certain.

“It would be a mistake to call it that Venezuela is currently living through a transition. What we are experiencing now is also a stabilization phase.”

The new minister is not one to believe

Gustavo Gonzalez Lopez It comes with a biography that is easy to read if you only pay attention to its face value. Ex-director of SEBIN, ex-jefe de contrainteligencia militar, involucrado en one of the worst repressions in the Maduro years.

On paper, the hard line seems to double the apogee on the same thing.

However, this reading ignores the political logic of its designation.

González López had a genuine friendship with Maduro during his time in the regime. Above all, the personal confidant of Delca Rodríguez, who contacted her from Casa Militar in the most critical hours after January 3, when everything could be unpacked.

Now let’s forget the least important detail: González López recently met with the director of the CIA when the US official visited Venezuela in the days immediately following Maduro’s ouster.

In the current architecture of Venezuelan power, this meeting was essential to its designation.

“The new criterion for the exercise of power in Venezuela is not ideology, nor loyalty to Chavismo. It is a legal revelation in the federal courts of the EEUU.”

Washington doesn’t give access to anyone who isn’t going to cooperate with what they’re building. The fact that you have no active federal claim in the United States indicates exactly what the consecutive number filter criteria are currently.

This is a real design realization. The new criterion for achieving significant power in Venezuela is not ideology, it is not a military anti-government, it does not seek loyalty in the traditional Chavista sentiment. It is legal exposure in the US federal courts.

If you are accused, you are responsible. If you are not accused, you are potentially useful.

It also explains why the removal of the Godfather was possible.

Having served the purpose of the force created in the weeks immediately following Maduro’s capture, when the FANB needed a close family member at the front to avoid any shocking behavior by the more than 2,000 generals who simultaneously administer Venezuela’s commercial and military interests, their participation turned into a major blackmail.

We are talking about a man with deep ties to Russia, no credible path that has current validity, and no role that comes with it.

We really are at this stage

It would be a mistake to call someone currently living in Venezuela a transition. The Trump administration has made it clear that it is targeting three phases for Venezuela. What we are experiencing right now is still the stabilization phase.

So we don’t get the Secretary of Defense that he wants in an ideal world, but the Secretary of Defense that crosses the umbrella that this specific stage requires. Without charges, with the trust of Delca, with the trust of Washington, and able to keep FANB unbroken while building a path to transition.

Your own Delcy goes back to back.

Don’t act like someone who wins, but like someone who manages an extremely delicate transfer of power, where any miscalculation—a general who rises to the top, a collective who is more responsive, a nationalist fracture in the armed forces—collapses the entire structure before it can begin the dosing phase.

Another part en caer

If the preceding logic is supported, the next significant move involves a Diosdado Cabello. And unlike the Godfather, Diosdado doesn’t have a clear head.

The godfather can be replaced with dignity. Delcy’s press release therefore commended your services and mentioned “new responsibilities”.

Through it all, Diosdado remains an active political bombshell. He is named under the same federal indictment as Maduro in a narco-terrorism case, as well as a $25 million government reward for information leading to his subsequent arrest, the largest in the world.

The note attachment hole is real, but you’re looking for it. Every day that the new order consolidates, the value of what Washington can offer diminishes. The intelligence behind the newspaper, the maps of the FARC and ELN reds, the financial architecture of twenty years of Chavista corruption, everything is less exclusive to what other fuentes come up with. Its value decreases in real time.

“The most difficult question is whether Delcy can move quickly enough within the institution without losing the inner coalition that now keeps things stable.”

A name worth watching to replace Diosdado at the Interior Ministry – and also on the table for defense – is Miguel Rodríguez Torres.

El hombre de Rodríguez Zapatero —quiz by sheer coincidence, the ex-president of Spain is exactly in Venezuela — is the ex-director of SEBIN, who had a spectacular split with Maduro and was imprisoned by his own regime. You have enough independence from the Madurist order because you know exactly where each corpse is registered.

You started partial public rehabilitation. His internal appointment sends a clear signal to Washington, the Venezuelan opposition and what the moderate Chavista base needs.

This is why Iran is changing everything

The ongoing operation in Iran is not a separate story from the Venezuelan one. It is accelerating.

A serious disruption by Iran’s oil minister creates a breach that Venezuela could theoretically weaken, but only theoretically, as Venezuela’s oil industry in its current production capacity is a shadow of what it once was.

Infrastructure has deteriorated, technical talent has emigrated, turnaround takes years. The sanction can be lifted any morning and Venezuelan production will not suffer significantly.

The world’s largest oil reserves exist, but beyond them there is a great demand for the kind of capital over a vast area that no serious business does in a country where property claims are arbitrary and contracts can be annulled by decree.

You can’t sell it Venezuelan oil as a strategic alternative to Iran’s minister in Chevron, ExxonMobil, in good markets without also selling a trusted status quo brand. The inversion thesis and the political stability thesis are converted into the same thesis.

This is an extremely useful convergence for those in the Trump administration who are driving the Venezuelan process, because it allows you to argue in the only language that decides in the last instance: negotiation, money, signal victory.

También creates a limited time. The situation with Iran is not ecstatic.

If there is a military escalation or a serious disruption to traffic on the Ormuz side, the wind in which Venezuelan oil matters most to global markets will open quickly and may close quickly. This is a requirement to close the stabilization phase before the opportunity arises.

The trickiest question is whether Delcy can move quickly enough within the institution – the state of the law, the fulfillment of contracts, the sign of a credible reversal – without losing the internal coalition that keeps things stable at the same time.

Because the people who need to maintain compliance in the short term are the very people who have spent thirty years exploiting the absence of everything that a foreign oil inversion would require.

That tension is a story to watch over the next six months.