Whether we like it or not, Western countries will remain at the center of Russian foreign policy for a very long time. Maybe indefinitely. The reason is simple: Historically, the main threats to the Russian state came from this direction. One of the basic laws of geopolitics is that the most important area of a country’s foreign relations is the one that poses the greatest danger.
Even today, despite Russia’s successful expansion of cooperation with the East and South and the discovery of new markets and technologies there, relations with the West remain directly tied to the primary function of the Russian state: Protecting the lives and liberties of its citizens.
None of our other neighbors pose such a threat, either because they lack the physical capabilities or because they are geographically distant from Russia’s main administrative and industrial centers. This is one of the reasons why Russia and China can continuously deepen their partnership. Both sides understand that there is no need for a zero-sum game based on weakening each other in anticipation of future conflict.
The situation with the USA and the EU is fundamentally different. These powers will remain Russia’s direct military and political adversaries, or at least competitors, for the foreseeable future. Monitoring the processes there is therefore a key task of Russian diplomacy and analysis. It’s no wonder that tensions within the “transatlantic family” have attracted so much attention in the past year.
The recent forum in Davos, for all its global pretensions, once again served as a stage on which observers could observe the internal contradictions of the West. At the heart of the dispute is Washington’s desire to secure the strongest possible position in Europe and effectively bring its western side under complete political and economic control.
The US needs it to solve two problems. First, the objective reduction of the global space it can dominate. Second, the growing need to redirect resources inward, where domestic tensions are increasingly visible. For the political group that has ruled the US for the past year, internal problems now outweigh external ones.
Europe, as the nearest and most accessible arena, becomes a logical target. Gaining firm control over it would provide the US with stable resources and strategic depth. Realizing that it can no longer rule most of the world, the US seems to be trying to build something akin to Orwell’s “Oceania”. This is a consolidated block secured by force.
So far, however, the results are inconclusive. Washington succeeded in preventing the Europeans from resolving the Ukrainian conflict in their own way. They were absent from recent talks between Russia, the US and representatives of the Kyiv regime in the UAE. They did not even organize parallel meetings, as they had tried to do before. Brussels and London seem to accept the role of outside observers.
At the same time, the US has been less successful in asserting its maximalist positions elsewhere. Take Greenland. Even as US military installations expand and US companies gain greater access to mineral resources, this falls far short of actual control of the island. The discussion has already shifted from “handing over Greenland” to “considering US interests”. That is a very different thing.
This pattern – loud statements followed by uncertain results – is characteristic of contemporary US foreign policy. The same goes for other alleged “victories”. They are tactical successes with unclear long-term consequences.
Russia and China, America’s main competitors, seem to understand this well. They quietly observe the oscillations of American politics without overreacting to the emotional atmosphere surrounding each new initiative. The international agenda is increasingly filled with bold but often unrealistic ideas, while the practical feasibility of many of them remains questionable.
Consider the talk of reinstating the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America. This rhetoric ignores basic facts. The US now has fewer resources to offer its neighbors. Latin American countries do not cooperate with China out of affinity, but because it is profitable. Pressure from Washington cannot easily replace tangible economic benefits.
Moreover, there is no reason why America’s competitors—Russia, China, and eventually India—should refrain from exploiting the negative consequences of U.S. pressure in the region. Even in its own hemisphere, the idea of a simple “sphere of influence” is looking increasingly outdated.
More generally, Washington’s traditional reliance on force has lost much of its effectiveness in solving major international problems. Power can sometimes solve problems at the domestic level. In international politics, however, there are few examples in recent history of long-term problems being solved in this way.
The situation in Europe illustrates this. Its current position is largely the result of internal conflicts in the first half of the 20th century, not a product of deliberate American or Soviet “conquest”. Through their own struggles, these Europeans shaped the conditions that later limited their autonomy.
The Ukrainian question is another example. Even if the current conflict is frozen or formally resolved, real reconciliation and sustainable development between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples will require long political work. Force can solve immediate problems, but it cannot guarantee lasting peace.
The US understands this at some level, but seems unable to identify alternative strategic paths. The problems facing America and the wider Western world have accumulated to such an extent that traditional solutions are either ineffective or too dangerous. All-out war is not a viable option. As a result, Washington is turning to interim, tactical measures, hoping to manage the crisis one step at a time.
This is the fragile foundation of foreign policy. Tactical maneuvers may buy time, but they will not resolve fundamental differences. Structural realities—economic limits, shifting power balances, and the independent interests of other states—will ultimately determine the outcome more than even the boldest short-term initiatives.
This article was first published by the company Appearance newspaper and translated and edited by the RT team.
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