The Trump Administration adopted rhetoric based on the assumption of a world divided into spheres of influence, reviving the “Monroe Doctrine” and reiterating its claim to control over the Americas.
China’s official position on “spheres of influence” is known, consistent and has been reiterated in Chinese strategic documents and diplomatic action. While traditional powers (such as the US and the former USSR) have historically divided the world into loyalty blocs, China argues that this model is archaic and counterproductive.
China has concerns about foreign powers operating around its territory and wants to increase its global power. However, it is a mistake to think that China shares the vision of a world divided into spheres of influence. It is quite possible, if not likely, that you will be fiercely opposed to this. Let’s see why.
1. End of Marxism-Leninism
Although there are still a handful of countries with totalitarian regimes based on the supposed “dictatorship of the proletariat” – PR China, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea, Cuba – the truth is that Marxism-Leninism, as an aggregating ideology of a huge ideological bloc alternative to the capitalist system, died with the fall of the Soviet Union and the transformation of the countries emerging from it into market economies.
In the case of PR China, despite central planning, the economic system is based on a market economy with an increasingly relevant private sector, and the political regime has had a progressive evolution towards a Confucian Leninist statewith a reinforcement of nationalism and a gradual return to Confucianism (and legalism), in which Confucianism serves to reinforce the Sinicization of Marxismalthough subordinated to strengthening the legitimacy of the PCC as the putative holder of the “Mandate of Heaven”.
For now, to wenming Chinese (cultural civilization) will continue to be subordinated to Marxism-Leninism. But time will dictate whether the ruling elite – which holds political control of the country through the PCC – will maintain a Marxist-Leninist party[-maoista-dengista-xiista] or whether it will gradually transform it into a party with a proto-Confucian ideology more rooted in Chinese history and culture.
In any case, despite some cooperation between the CCP and the communist parties of the few countries mentioned above, China’s external relations are dictated by reasons other than ideological solidarity and the CCP maintains institutional relations, at international level, with many other political parties from other ideological quadrants, starting with the traditional “Menshevik” enemies (parties of the Socialist International).
2. The legacy of the “century of humiliation”
For China, the concept of spheres of influence is intrinsically linked to the colonialism and imperialism of the 19th and early 20th centuries. During the call century of humiliationChina itself was carved up into “zones of interest” by foreign powers.
The Chinese government defends the principle of “non-interference” in internal affairs as a corollary of the absolute sovereignty of each country. Supporting spheres of influence would validate the idea that larger countries have the right to dictate the fate of smaller countries, something that PR China condemns to prevent the same from being done against it.
3. The “partnership, not alliance” model
Unlike the USA, which has a vast network of mutual defense treaties (such as NATO, AUKUS, QUAD), China prefers what it calls strategic partnerships.
Beijing prefers flexibility: Formal alliances create security obligations that could drag China into unwanted conflicts.
Keeping focus on the strands commercial e economicby avoiding rigid military blocs, China is able to maintain trade relations with countries that are, in theory, rivals to each other (such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, or Israel and Arab nations).
4. China’s self-restraint in exercising its sovereignty
For now, China has restricted its sovereignty-based claims to the South China Sea, the East China Sea and Taiwan, as a corollary of the “One China” policy.
Despite its aggressive stance in occupying islets and atolls in the South China Sea within the EEZs of neighboring states, China has not invaded or overthrown rival regimes in Southeast Asia, as the US did in Latin America and the USSR/Russia in Eastern Europe – with one exception: the brief and disastrous invasion of Vietnam in 1979, to honor the defense agreement with Cambodia, which had been invaded by Vietnam, to put an end to the genocidal regime. of Khmer Rouge.
Even in relation to fragile neighboring states – such as Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos – Beijing has been careful, using the path of cooperation and economic trade and investment.
5. Shift to multipolarity
China defends a world order multipolarwhere power is distributed and not concentrated in large “poles” that dominate specific geographic regions.
By rejecting spheres of influence, China positions itself as the “champion of the developing world”, contrasting its stance with the hegemonismo of the US, which Beijing often accuses of maintaining a Cold War mentality.
5. Globalization and interdependence – China aims to be a global power
The spheres of influence theory also goes against China’s claim to be a [super]global power. The country has invested in the existing institutional multilateral order – where its influence is greater every year – and encouraged the creation of new international organizations and global initiatives.
China’s rise occurred within the global trading system, having benefited greatly from globalization. The establishment of a closed “sphere” could limit China’s access to vital markets and technologies in other parts of the world.
A bet on BRICS – which are growing and including new middle powers on all continents – gives it a special role in dialogue with the Global South and expanding its ties with developing countries around the world.
Realistically, it has recently stopped claiming to be a developing country – which has been correct since joining the Movement [dos Países] Non-Aligned, in the 50s of the 20th century, until the first two decades of the 21st century – and assumed the role of a great industrial, commercial and technological power, and also, to a lesser extent, military.
Despite the gradual relocation of Chinese companies to other geographies – namely Southeast Asia and East Africa – the export sector continues to be central to sustaining the economic growth of the Chinese economy. At the same time, China has been investing significantly in the development of foreign markets capable of consuming production surpluses unable to be absorbed by Chinese consumers.
Instead of direct political control, China uses investments in infrastructure, logistics and primary and secondary sectors to gain influence, the best example of which is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Beijing argues this is “shared development” rather than an attempt to create a bloc of political satellites.
On the other hand, to reinforce its food and energy security, China continues to be a net importer of food and hydrocarbons, having diversified its supply chains.
In short, China needs to maintain and strengthen its influence in all regions of the world, not just its immediate surroundings. Yours global economic integration it is an essential condition for its growth and prosperity, which, in turn, is crucial for honoring the social pact between the CCP and the Chinese population – prosperity and economic and social well-being in return for a reduction in civil and political rights.
Some analysts believe that China is seeking a regional primacy in Asia that would have the characteristics of a modern sphere of influence, only dressed in a language of “cooperation win-win“However, China’s strategy and actions are on a global, not regional, scale.
Accepting a world divided into spheres of influence would limit China’s freedom of global economic action and call into question China’s entire strategy, and this is in no way possible for its leadership.
Furthermore, despite the recent ‘Monroean’ rhetoric from the US leadership, reality shows that the US continues to operate on a global scale – whether economically or militarily. Therefore, the Chinese leadership interprets the US discourse on spheres of influence as yet another way of trying to contain China’s rise and expansion at the international level.
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